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Abstract—The proliferation of mobile devices and apps 
together with the increasing public interest in privacy and data 
protection matters necessitate a more careful precaution for legal 
compliance. As apps are becoming more popular, app developers 
can expect an increased scrutiny of privacy practices in the 
future. In this paper, we focus on the problem of the disclosure of 
personal data to third parties and the role of app developers to 
enhance user privacy and data protection in the app ecosystem. 
We discuss the EU data protection principles and apply them to 
the mobile app context. We then derive requirements and 
guidelines for app developers on how to contribute to the 
protection of their users’ data. 
Index Terms—Legal Requirements, Mobile App Development, 
Privacy by Design, Anonymisation, Big Data, EU Data Protection 
Legislation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the recent advance in data mining technologies and 
the massive increase in computing power and data storage 
capacity, data processing became notably faster and cheaper 
than before [1]. A large amount of the processed data is 
retrieved from apps that run on mobile devices. Hundreds of 
thousands of apps access and process the data of their users. 
These data often reveal large quantities of personal 
information, which are sometimes used for other purposes than 
initially intended. For instance, app owners (also called app 
vendors) might disclose personal user data to third parties in 
order to get insight into the behaviour of their users or to 
improve their apps [2]. The same data can be used in ways 
different from what was initially foreseen, sometimes without 
the awareness and the agreement of users [3]. 
According to the EU Data Protection Directive, personal 
information can only be processed in ways that are compatible 
with a specific purpose (Art. 6, 1), b Directive 95/46/EC) [4]. 
New techniques of using big data have put the notion of 
“compatible use” under pressure by extending and stretching its 
meaning. As this endangers the privacy of users, additional or 
alternative privacy-preserving paths should be explored. This is 
a complicated exercise because the protection of privacy and 
personal data needs a certain level of abstractness to be 
technology neutral and sufficiently comprehensive. Moreover, 
privacy and data protection are often victims of many cultural 
[5] and nationally inspired obstacles and pitfalls. Privacy is a 
domain that is characterised by diverse requirements and 
dynamic expectations with typically substantial differences 
amongst the EU Member States and beyond [5]. 
In this paper, we focus on the role of app developers. As 
apps are becoming more popular, app developers can expect an 
increased scrutiny of privacy practices in the future. App 
developers have a major influence on how data processing is 
undertaken and how user information is presented within the 
app [3]. However, to achieve a sufficient level of protection, 
active involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the software 
and data management lifecycle is required [3]. App developers 
often have to collaborate with other parties in the app 
ecosystem and the final responsibility towards the data subjects 
(i.e. the individuals under protection) remains an obligation of 
the data controller (Art. 2, d) Directive 95/46/EC). 
Nevertheless, we argue that privacy and data protection have to 
grow as a default mode of design and operation [6] and that app 
developers can bring an important contribution to the 
protection of user privacy by taking privacy-friendly decisions 
already in the early stages of the development process.  
Technical research on privacy and data protection is often 
reduced to research on anonymisation techniques. However, 
anonymisation cannot be the only safeguard for privacy and 
data protection [7]. In Section II we elaborate further on the 
strengths and weaknesses of anonymisation techniques to 
assess whether they provide a sufficient level of privacy and 
data protection. In Section III we introduce the main legal 
principles of EU data protection law: the principle of purpose 
limitation, the principle of data minimisation, the principle of 
data security, and the principle of transparency. Afterwards, in 
Section IV we delve deeper into the meaning behind those 
principles in order to acquire more concrete guidelines and 
requirements for app developers. In Section V we discuss the 
limitations of our guidelines on three different levels. First, 
privacy will always have a certain level of subjectivity 
coloured by many different perspectives such as the cultural 
backgrounds and the technical affinity of the users. Second, the 
role of app developers in the overall privacy and data 
protection chain is sometimes limited, as data protection 
remains an obligation of the data controller. Third, our 
discourse is also burdened with geographical limitations as data 
protection is a national competence and enforcement is limited 
ratione loci. Finally, we summarise the related work in Section 
VI and conclude the paper in Section VII. 
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II. ANONYMISATION AS A SOLUTION FOR PRIVACY AND 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION? 
The evolution in big data analytics creates more drivers to 
disclose personal information of users to third parties, e.g., to 
get more insight in the app performance or to personalise the 
app services [2]. However, European data protection law limits 
further use of personal data to what is compatible with the 
specified purpose of the initial use (Art. 6, 1), b Directive). It is 
likely that the disclosure of personal data to third parties is 
incompatible with the initial purpose of the processing 
operation and this might raise data protection concerns.  
One way to avoid these concerns follows from Recital 26 of 
the Data Protection Directive, which excludes anonymised data 
from the scope of EU data protection legislation [4]. This 
means that when personal datasets are sufficiently anonymised, 
the data can be further processed for other purposes and the 
datasets disclosed to third parties. However, the Data 
Protection Directive lacks a prescriptive technical standard and 
does not state which anonymisation techniques are sufficiently 
de-identifying under EU law. Recital 26 means that to 
sufficiently anonymise personal data, the datasets must be 
irreversibly stripped from all personal elements (such that the 
data subject can no longer be identified) by all means which 
are likely reasonable to be used by either the data controller or 
by any other third party [8]. Since sufficient anonymisation of 
data falls outside the scope of the Data Protection Directive, we 
wonder to which extent the use of anonymisation techniques 
should be considered as a sufficient protection of personal data. 
If considered as a sufficient protection, the use of anonymi-
sation techniques provides a way to further process data about 
users and to disclose this information to third parties without 
breaching EU data protection law [8] [9]. For instance, when 
traffic data are effectively anonymised prior to their disclosure 
any concerns regarding incompatible processing are removed, 
as there is no risk of re-identification [9]. 
Even though EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of 
personal data excludes irreversibly anonymised data from its 
applicable scope, it is still possible that the user’s privacy rights 
(Art. 8 European Convention on Human Rights) are 
endangered by the disclosure, e.g., in case of profiling [8]. 
Privacy and data protection do not completely overlap. Despite 
some similarities, there are multiple differences from the 
formally legal and the substantive legal points of view [10]. 
This means that compliance with privacy law does not 
necessarily imply compliance with data protection law and vice 
versa. Certainly, anonymised data cannot completely escape 
the data protection obligation, as anonymised data have to be 
processed from personal data before they become anonymised 
[8]. Therefore, anonymisation techniques cannot completely 
deprive users of their data protection rights as personal data 
always enjoy the initial protection before the anonymisation 
can be considered irreversible. Only once the data are 
sufficiently anonymised, the data protection principles are no 
longer applicable. 
A pertinent question remains unanswered: From which 
point on should personal data be considered irreversibly un-
identifiable. In order to determine whether a dataset is 
sufficiently anonymised, the Article 29 Working Party (which 
is an independent working group in the European Union that 
deals with privacy and data protection matters) uses the criteria 
of “all”, “likely” and “reasonable” [8]. All personal identifiers 
must be filtered from the datasets to make it unlikely that the 
data controller or any other third party would reasonably be 
able to re-identify the data subject on the basis of the data at 
stake.  
In addition, the Working Party highlights three technical 
risks that endanger the robustness of a given anonymisation 
technique: singling out, linkability, and inference [8]. Those 
technical risks are typical for anonymisation and can be used as 
criteria to assess the legal robustness of the technique or 
practice. “Singling out” refers to the question whether it is still 
possible to isolate personal identifiers in a dataset. 
“Linkability” refers to the ability to link a record to a data 
subject or a group of data subjects, e.g., by means of 
correlation. “Inference” refers to the possibility to deduce the 
value of an attribute or a set of attributes, with significant 
probability.  
The Article 29 Working Party sets out the legal strengths 
and weaknesses of several anonymisation practices in Opinion 
05/2014 [8]. Without delving deeply into the details of different 
anonymisation techniques, we can summarise that, for all 
anonymisation techniques, the common mistakes and failures 
impede the irreversible and sufficient anonymisation of 
personal data [7]. For example, as each record will still be 
derived from a single data subject, randomisation will not 
reduce the singularity of each record [8]. Combined with 
generalisation techniques, a better privacy protection can be 
guaranteed. Generalisation techniques have their flaws though. 
While generalisation “can be effective to prevent singling out, 
it does not allow effective anonymisation in all cases; in 
particular, it requires specific and sophisticated quantitative 
approaches to prevent linkability and inference” [8]. 
Besides the technical hindrances for robust data anonymi-
sation, there are also more practical concerns. In particular, for 
the disclosure of personal data collected from mobile apps, 
irreversible anonymisation of datasets might decrease the value 
of the data for the third party to whom the data are disclosed to 
the extent that the disclosure itself would become irrelevant for 
the third party. The disclosure of irreversibly anonymised data 
would no longer suffice the purpose of the disclosure. For 
instance, the third party might need raw data or non-
anonymised data to provide the app owner with the insights 
requested or a certain level of identification might be required 
to have value for marketing purposes. 
The sole reliance on anonymisation techniques for data 
protection is hardly sufficient for now [7]. In the future, 
anonymisation techniques might provide a more solid solution 
for data protection once they become more robust against 
singling out, linkability, and inference [8]. Until then, other 
measures should be implemented. Thus the following question 
remains open: How can developers contribute to the protection 
of user data from two perspectives: (1) on the way to 
anonymisation as long as anonymisation is used as a personal 
data processing operation, and (2) when the anonymisation 
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technique is considered insufficiently irreversible and personal 
user data are still being processed. 
III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF DATA PROTECTION 
Even though the national implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive allows a certain differentiation amongst 
EU Member States, the Directive draws the general conditions 
for fair and lawful processing of personal information [4]. 
Those conditions are summarised below in four main 
principles: the principle of purpose limitation (Art. 6, 1), b 
Directive), the principle of data minimisation (Art. 6, 1), c-e 
Directive), the principle of data security (Art. 17 Directive) and 
the principle of transparency (Art. 10,- Directive). 
A. Purpose Limitation 
The principle of purpose limitation plays an important role 
in the protection of users against disclosure of personal data to 
third parties. It explicitly limits the secondary use of personal 
data for purposes incompatible with the specified purpose of 
the initial processing. The purpose limitation principle enables 
users to make deliberate choices to trust apps with their 
personal data. They will learn how their data will be used and 
they will be able to rely on the limitative purpose description to 
understand the purposes for which their data will be used [3].  
The principle of purpose limitation has two aspects: 
purpose specification (specified, explicit, and legitimate 
purpose) and compatible use (no further processing of data in 
an incompatible way) [9]. The “reasons for the collection, use, 
and disclosure of personally identifiable information should be 
identified to the data subject at or before the time of data 
collection. Personal information cannot be used or disclosed for 
purposes other than those for which it was collected except 
with the consent of the individual or as authorised by law” [11]. 
For example, an app that is installed to enable e-mail 
communication between users cannot automatically link the e-
mail addresses of the users to their telephone numbers or 
disclose this information to third parties without the renewed 
consent of the app users. 
B. Data Minimisation 
Even when the processing of personal data complies with a 
legitimate purpose, the processing must be necessary and 
proportionate. The principle of data minimisation requires that 
personal information can only be used or disclosed in order to 
achieve the specified purpose of the processing (which 
technically means collection, storage, or analysis). Thus, data 
can only be processed, if the processing is adequate, relevant, 
and not excessive in relation to the specific purpose for which 
the data was collected (Art. 6, 1) c Directive). This principle 
also implies that the processing is to be carried out in the least-
intrusive way, considering, e.g., the risks at stake, the amount 
of data involved, and the purpose of processing. When the 
information is no longer accurate or necessary, it should be 
erased. For instance, imagine an app that identifies the title of 
the song the user is listening to. For this, the audio recording 
feature of the mobile device must be enabled. However, any 
monitoring or recording of audio at a moment not specifically 
asked for by the user is likely to be considered excessive and 
unlawful [3]. 
C. Data Security 
The third principle relates to the security of the data. As 
malware and viruses for mobile devices are on the rise, data 
security measures should avoid the loss of large amounts of 
personal information processed on mobile devices [12]. One 
particular risk is the loss or the theft of the mobile device and 
the resulting illegitimate access to the data collected by the app. 
Data security implies that “confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability should be safeguarded as appropriate to the 
sensitivity of the information” [9]. This implies the 
implementation of technical measures to limit data loss and 
data breaches. For this principle many guidelines, 
specifications, and best practices are available, for instance 
those of the ENISA [13]. 
D. Transparency 
The last principle concerns the transparency of the 
processing and the empowerment of the user. Transparency 
means that users must be informed about the reasons behind 
the processing, the categories of data being processed about 
them, and the “destiny” of their data. User participation means: 
“Individuals should be empowered to play a participatory role 
in the lifecycle of their own personal data and should be made 
aware of the practices associated with its use and disclosure” 
[9]. This includes also concerns about the meaningful consent.  
In order to be meaningful, consent must be given prior to a 
specific processing, based on a free and informed choice to 
accept or refuse the processing of personal data. For instance, 
for an app that provides information about nearby social 
activities, consent must be asked prior to the installation of the 
app and separately again each time the geo-location of the user 
is accessed [3]. This means also that the location of the user 
cannot be used for purposes incompatible with the goal to 
provide the user with information about nearby social 
activities. The location of the user cannot be transferred to third 
parties without an additional consent of the user. 
IV. FROM LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
In this section we derive concrete recommendations for app 
developers to protect user privacy and to minimise the risks of 
an unlawful disclosure of personal data to third parties. 
A. Purpose Limitation 
Article 6, 1), b of the Data Protection Directive requires that 
personal data are only collected for specified, explicit, and 
legitimate purposes.  
App developers should describe the purpose of their apps 
and the data processing operations carried out by their apps in a 
well-defined and comprehensible way for an average user 
without a legal or technical knowledge to understand [3]. For 
instance, the purpose might be described in the app store or in a 
special view in the app itself. A good practice is also to list the 
features of the app in the specific app page in the app store. In 
this page, developers can give information about the data 
collection and processing performed by the app as well as the 
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purpose of the collection and processing. The purpose should 
be sufficiently specified to enable the implementation of 
necessary data protection safeguards and the scope of the 
processing operation delimited [9]. The app store categorisation 
can be a first indicator for the description of the purpose and 
should therefore be carefully selected. A gaming app is likely 
to process personal information for the purposes of keeping 
competition records, while a restaurant finder might process 
personal information for the purpose of locating nearby 
restaurants. In case the processing of personal information by 
the app is ambiguous, more details on the purpose are required 
[9]. This means that if the purpose of the processing is clear 
within a certain context, usually less details are required. The 
same holds in case the processing of data goes beyond what is 
customary in a given context [9]. The purpose should also be 
explicit, meaning that it has to be clearly expressed, so that the 
user can understand the reasons behind the processing. Finally, 
the purpose should be legitimate and compatible with all 
legal principles of applicable law, such as non-discrimination 
principles. For instance, racial profiling where “white” 
customers pay higher prices than “Asian” customers is an 
illegitimate purpose [9]. 
Further processing of personal information cannot be 
incompatible with the purposes for which the personal data 
were collected and initially specified and must thus meet the 
requirement of compatibility (Art. 6, 1) b Directive). For 
instance, it is not allowed to transfer personal information of 
users to third parties for market research without the consent of 
the users. This means that such disclosure of data is not 
automatically allowed and that additional user consent is 
required. App developers might prevent incompatible use 
without prior renewed consent.  
The Article 29 Working Party lists some key factors to be 
considered during the compatibility assessment [9]. As most 
obvious the Working Party points to the relationship between 
the purposes for which the data have been collected and the 
purposes of further processing. This refers to the substance of 
the processing and covers mainly situations where the further 
processing was already more or less implied in, or assumed as, 
a logical next step of the initial purpose. For example, a 
department for transport asked a telecommunications company 
to provide mobile phone location data in order to calculate the 
speed at which the phones are moving over various routes. The 
department wanted to take traffic-calming measures based on 
this information. However, it is unlikely that the purposes 
related to road traffic are compatible with the telecom 
information initially collected [9]. Other key factors are the 
nature of the data (e.g., content vs. metadata vs. interaction data 
vs. sensor data), the impact of the further processing on the 
data subjects, the measures applied by the controller to ensure 
fair processing, and the measures taken to prevent any undue 
impact on the data subjects. 
B. Data Minimisation 
Mobile devices typically have direct access to different 
sensors and data. Apps often abundantly collect personal 
information from smartphones without any meaningful or 
obvious relationship to the functionality of the app [3]. The 
challenge for app developers is to keep the collection, storage, 
and use of personal data to a minimum from the early stages of 
the development process. The collection and the use of 
personal data should be limited to what is reasonably 
necessary to achieve the desired functionality. In case 
specific data will be needed for a feature that is planned for 
future releases, we recommend either to explicitly state this or 
to handle the data collection and processing at the design time 
but not at the run time. Once the feature is implemented and the 
data collection and processing is “instantiated” at run time, a 
new consent must be collected from the user. The first step is to 
find out whether the app needs to process personal information 
at all. This means that app developers should carefully consider 
the relevancy of the personal data they tend to process. 
Collecting information that is out of scope of the app purpose 
might also discourage potential users [14].  
Studies found that users care about the relevance of the 
information requested by the app. If they perceive a potential 
privacy violation, they would opt-out of the app rather than to 
change their privacy settings [14]. Also in case the processing 
of personal information is truly necessary, the processing of the 
data should be kept to the minimum for the app to function. 
One way to assess whether the processing is necessary is by 
defining the reasons why certain information is related to 
the features of the app. If this is not possible, it is likely that 
the information is not necessary for the app to function.  
To define the reasons behind certain information, it is 
helpful to categorise different types of data used in the app. 
From a legal point of view a distinction can be made between 
non-personal information, personal information, and sensitive 
personal information [4]. Personal information includes all 
information that relates to a person such as the name, the birth 
date, or the credit card number. Sensitive personal data are the 
data “revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and 
the processing of data concerning health or sex life” (Art. 8, 1) 
Directive). For instance, a health app might need sensitive 
health data about the user whereas it is questionable whether a 
music app needs such kind of sensitive data. The data 
minimisation principle also applies for non-sensitive 
information. The collection and use of data cannot go beyond 
what is necessary for the goals of the app.  
To keep the processing of data to a minimum, the amount 
of information should be limited to what is suitable to achieve 
the processing objective. Excessive or disproportionate 
processing of personal data is not allowed and cannot be 
legitimised by user consent. For instance, in order for an app to 
collect audio data or to activate the camera, a specific 
permission must be asked from the user. However, for an 
optional feature of an alarm clock that enables users to give 
verbal commands to silence or snooze the alarm, voice 
recording that goes beyond this purpose (e.g., audio recording 
whilst the alarm is silent) is likely to be excessive and 
unlawful. For a music app to pause music and receive incoming 
calls, a permission to monitor the calls must be asked. But even 
when granted, this permission only applies for the time when 
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the music app is running. A continuous monitoring of all call 
activities at all times is likely unlawful and excessive.  
Besides the legal categorisation, there are various technical 
categorisations of information. Those might be based on a 
distinction between the available types of data, implying a 
distinction between technical data, on-device data, user entered 
data, and cookies [15]. However, for the protection of personal 
data such technical functionality-based data categories cannot 
be addressed at once. Some technical data, such as the device 
name, might include personal information about users. In some 
cases, technical information, such as IP addresses, might even 
inherently include personal information about a user. Although 
the technical distinction between several data categories might 
have a functional advantage, in order to sufficiently protect 
personal data it is recommended to categorise the data based 
on the legal categories of personal data instead of on 
technical categories as the criterion for applicability of the 
principles cannot be generalised to very general categories but 
should be specified for each data element separately. 
Data minimisation during storage can be achieved by a 
limitation of the time for which the gathered data is kept. 
Even after deletion requests, service providers seem to be very 
reluctant to delete the personal data. Service providers prefer to 
make the data inaccessible rather than physically purging the 
data from storage [16]. Legally speaking, data is only deleted 
once all identifiers are filtered (sufficient anonymisation) or 
when the data are erased from the databases. Even without a 
user’s request to erase certain data, personal data cannot be 
kept for longer than necessary.  
Determining for how much time the data can be kept is 
difficult. First, the storage of data might be hard limited or 
obliged for certain purposes and for a certain time. For 
instance, the discussed and rejected Data Retention Directive 
prescribed the storage of some traffic data for 6 months for law 
enforcement purposes [17]. However, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union recently declared the Data Retention 
Directive invalid with immediate effect, as it constituted a 
disproportionate restriction on the fundamental rights to 
privacy, data protection, and freedom of expression [18]. 
Another hard limit is the deletion of an account. When a user 
deletes his account, the personal information should be 
promptly erased immediately after.  
In case no hard limit is applicable, the next step is to define 
a reasonable retention period to keep the personal 
information about the users. For example, the retention period 
for a calendar app is controlled by the user. Once the user 
erases the data, there is no need for the app to keep the 
information for a longer time. For a navigation app on the other 
hand, it might be necessary to store the locations visited in the 
past. This could be limited to a reasonable number of visits or 
by a certain timeframe in the past. In order to efficiently 
enforce the hard and soft retention limits, app developers 
should develop procedures to delete the no longer needed 
personal data automatically. 
C. Data Security 
Poor security measures for storage and transfer of user data 
cause additional risks for the protection of the users’ personal 
data. As the value of personal data is raising drivers for 
malicious intrusions is raising as well. Insufficient information 
security often leads to unauthorised access or unauthorised 
processing of personal information. For instance, imagine an 
app that advices women about their menstrual cycle. If this app 
does not sufficiently secure the communication of data between 
the client and the server, and a woman requests a back-up, her 
sensitive health data are transferred to the server in an 
unencrypted form, in a way readable and accessible by other 
users of a shared Wi-Fi network [19]. Information about 
users should thus be protected during storage and during 
communication between the app components. There are 
multiple ways to enhance personal data security. For example, 
access to user information stored in the server should be 
restricted to a “need to know” basis in the organisation of the 
app owner. A user authentication should be required for the use 
of the app on the device.  
The use of encryption methods also limits the risks of 
misusing personal data. Encryption should be used by 
default [11]. All files and all communication transactions 
should be encrypted. For instance, for the transmission of data, 
it is recommended to use transport layer encryption (HTTPS) 
by default [16]. All network communication should be 
encrypted, e.g., with SSL or stronger methods. For sensitive 
personal data even stronger encryption methods should be used 
[16]. Finally, user information should never be transmitted in 
clear text and passwords should never be stored in clear text. 
Data security is an obligation under EU law, without being 
sufficient for the protection of personal information. It is thus 
important to note that the encryption of data is not equal to the 
anonymisation of data. Even when decently hashed and 
secured, personal data remain personal as long as they are not 
stripped from all personal identifiers and re-identification 
remains possible. The distinction between anonymised data and 
secured data is highly relevant as Recital 26 of the Data 
Protection Directive only excludes anonymised data from the 
scope of the data protection legislation [4]. This means that the 
data protection principles are fully applicable in case of 
insufficient anonymisation. 
D. Transparency 
Users must be aware of the processing of their data, 
including the disclosure of their data to third parties. 
However, users are often left in the dark. In 2012 only 61.3% 
of the top 150 apps provided a privacy policy that sufficiently 
explained to the users which data were collected through the 
app and for which purposes [20]. Even when apps have a 
privacy policy, sometimes the text is unclear or incomplete. For 
instance, some applications mention in their policies that no 
personal data are processed, while actually they do process 
information about users, e.g., the unique numbers of the users 
or their devices [21]. One problem that results from this lack of 
transparency is that users are not fully aware of the processing 
operations. Therefore they cannot grant their meaningful 
consent. Since the cognitive limits of users make consent 
almost a legal fiction large attention must be paid to a 
transparent communication [22]. Transparency is thus of great 
importance to obtain the meaningful consent of the user. Other 
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challenges should be mentioned in particular for mobile apps. 
For instance, the limited screen size makes the presentation of 
additional information to users harder. The overload of pop-ups 
and notifications causes a notice fatigue. Finally, the lack of a 
designated area in app stores or in the screen designs to inform 
users or a common way to communicate the necessary 
information, complicates the process to obtain user consent.  
App developers should ensure that their design does not 
conceal an actual or a potential disclosure of information  
[23]. In addition, app developers should ensure that the system 
remains reasonably transparent and subject to independent 
verification by all relevant stakeholders, including customers, 
users, and affiliated organisations. When personal information 
is used for third party purposes such as advertising and 
analytics or when sensitive personal information about a user is 
collected, an enhanced notice is recommended. Finally, in 
order to provide the user with a comprehensive description of 
disclosure and transfer practices, app developers must 
understand the third-party components and code they are 
using to ensure that no more information is collected than 
communicated. 
Privacy policies must be easy accessible, easy to find, 
concise, and precise. Long and complicated policies should be 
avoided to reduce notice fatigue and information overload, but 
the message must be sufficiently clear and comprehensive. It is 
recommended to place a link in a prominent space pointing 
the user to the privacy policy and the terms of use not only 
before the app is installed or downloaded but also while the app 
is being used. The policies themselves should be easy to read 
and browse on the device. They should be clear and written in 
a simple language appropriate to the audience, taking into 
account the respective age, special needs, nationality, and 
culture of the individuals targeted. For instance, a government 
website with advice for elderly is not the same as a gaming 
website aimed at teenagers. 
In order to keep the policy simple, different types of 
privacy practices can be displayed in a grid or by a “nutrition 
label for privacy”. However, over-simplification should be 
avoided since sufficient granularity is needed ensure that all 
purposes are clear for the users [24]. By using a layered 
notice, a policy can highlight its most relevant parts regarding 
privacy, while providing links to the details. The Article 29 
Working Party considers the layered notice often as a 
“workable way to provide key information to data subjects in a 
very concise and user-friendly manner, while also supplying 
additional information on the next ‘layer’ for the benefit of 
those who require further clarification” [24]. 
Another way of drawing attention to the privacy policy is 
by using media, such as graphics, icons, labels, images, 
colours, and sounds. For instance, a selective use of sound 
could alert users when privacy crucial operations occur. Once 
the purpose of the processing is changing or for every 
additional processing operation that is not compatible with the 
initial use, an update in the policy must describe the changes or 
the additional use. Silent or secret updates must be avoided. 
Renewed consent should be asked before the changes are 
enforced. The effective date of the policy and the process of 
modifications should be visible on these updates. It is 
recommended to provide a brief statement with a hyperlink 
to the old policy. It is also a good practice to present the 
privacy policy in a browser and in an extra view within the app.  
In addition, users must be able to exercise their rights of 
access, rectification, erasure, and to object to data processing. 
They also must be informed about the existence of those 
features. App developers should provide the tools to report 
problems and exercise the data subject rights.  
Whenever necessary a freely given, informed, and specific 
consent must be obtained from the users before the app is 
installed. However, a simple “Yes” or “No” consent does no 
longer fulfil the complexity of privacy implications. We 
therefore encourage a more active participation of the user 
when giving their consent [16], e.g., in a multi-step process or 
reactive user interface. In any case, users must have the 
opportunity to choose differently and to change their choices at 
any time in the future. For this, app developers might provide a 
privacy dashboard that displays the actions users can take to 
modify their privacy settings including activation/ 
deactivation buttons for processing operations if suitable.  
When reasonably possible, it is recommended to enable 
users a granular consent for each type of data the app will 
access: minimum for location, contacts, unique device 
identifier, identity of the data subject, identity of the phone, 
credit card, and payment data, telephony and SMS, browsing 
history, email, social networks credentials and biometrics [24]. 
In addition users should be able to revoke their consent, 
uninstall apps, and delete the data. For instance, a restaurants 
app using location information should seek consent before the 
app is installed and every time when geo-location data are 
accessed separately. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Tension Between Law and Technology 
User expectations even left aside, a large gap exists 
between legal and technological perceptions of privacy. The 
relationship between law and technology is highly complex. 
Law is inherently abstract, while requirements should be 
concrete. While law leaves room for interpretations in a 
specific context, requirements typically anticipate all technical 
scenarios supported by the system. Requirements go beyond 
the application of legal rules in a specific and known context. 
They should capture other potential contexts as well. 
In addition, law has a typical a posteriori character, while 
technology has typically an a priori character. The a posteriori 
character of law is twofold. First, law is developed after real-
life problems showed the inability of existing law to them. 
Second, the goal of law is to create and maintain legal 
certainty, and to be enforced in case an imbalance occurred, 
which is usually the case after an issue happens. As a 
consequence, legal assessments of reality are typically event 
and impact driven. This means that the legal evaluation of 
reality is based on the impact of a certain commission (or 
omission) on other parties (users), rather than on the goal to 
shape and establish innovative changes to reality. Technology, 
on the other hand, is functionality or goal driven. This implies 
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that technical innovation is evaluated during the development 
of the technology, before its impact is known. Lawyers and 
developers are often driven by different types of questions. 
Lawyers ask questions such as, “Did an interference occur?” 
“Was there a breach?” or “Can this breach be justified?” In 
contrast, developers ask questions such as, “What is missing” 
and “How to overcome this?” Legal questions are asked after 
an event occurred, while technical questions are asked before.  
B. Role of the App Developers 
Privacy-unaware app-developers may “create significant 
risks to the private life and reputation of users of smart 
devices” [3]. By taking privacy-friendly design decisions in the 
early stages of the app design, developers significantly increase 
the protection of personal data in later stages of data 
management lifecycle.  
The importance of privacy by design is formally recognised 
by Article 23 of the proposed Data Protection Regulation. The 
familiar EU data protection landscape with the central Data 
Protection Directive is changing. The proposed data reform 
package consists of two legislative documents aiming at a more 
comprehensive and coherent policy on the fundamental right to 
personal data in the European Union. The first document, a 
Regulation, should harmonise the general data protection in 
Europe in general [25] [26]. The second, a Directive, covers the 
data protection issues in the context of law enforcement [27]. 
Article 23 of the proposed Data Protection Regulation 
introduces the principle of privacy by design as a formal and 
enforceable principle into EU data protection law [25]. It is the 
crowning of the momentum behind privacy by design that has 
been steadily growing for years [28]. Article 23 translates the 
idea of privacy as an outset instead of an afterthought [11]. It 
presents privacy by design as the mitigation of privacy 
concerns and the achievement of data protection compliance by 
embedding privacy-requirements and privacy-preserving 
solutions in the engineering of products and services [6]. 
Privacy should be embraced from within the system design to 
become an integral part of the system without constraining the 
system functionality [11]. Privacy should grow to a default 
mode of design and operation in which all relevant actors in the 
lifecycle of personal data are involved.  
Even though the technical implementation of privacy by 
design is essentially the task of the app developer, the 
responsibility of the quality of compliance still remains with 
the data controller. Under European law, the data controller is 
the person who determines the goals and the means of the 
processing operation (Art. 2, d) Data Protection Directive). In 
some cases this might be the developer, but it can also be 
another legal person. Article 23 is presently not addressed to 
developers. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the principles of 
privacy by design are of great importance for developers as 
controllers are bound by them and accountable for compliance. 
Contractual obligations are likely to create incentives for the 
market of relevant goods and services [28].  
The process of translating and implementing privacy 
principles into system requirements is often called privacy 
engineering and can be considered as “the gathering and 
application of privacy requirements with the same primacy as 
other traditional feature or process requirements and then 
incorporating, prioritising, and addressing them at each stage of 
the development lifecycle, whether it’s for a process, project, 
product, system, application, or other. [...] The intent of privacy 
engineering is to close the gap between privacy policy and the 
reality of systems or technologies or processes. The greater the 
mismatch between the two, the greater the opportunity for 
needless inefficiencies, risk, or both” [29]. The implementation 
of privacy by design principles into software apps is a 
complicated exercise. The heterogeneous nature of distinct 
social, legal, and ethical concerns around privacy complicates 
the concrete translation in terms of system requirements [30] 
[23]. The role of the developer can be clarified by an important 
distinction Solove made to describe the notion of information 
privacy [31]. He distinguishes the control and immediate 
access to oneself from reducing the risk that personal 
information might be used in an unwanted way. This 
distinction between access control and risk management has 
been seen to suggest “two distinct dimensions to building 
privacy-friendly technologies and information systems” [32]. 
In this regard, developers are responsible for ensuring users 
immediate control over access to their personal information, 
and also for minimising future privacy risks by the protection 
of the information about the users. Another approach is to 
choose the best way to meet user expectations. Clarity on the 
expectations of users should help to determine which domains 
of risk are the most important to tackle. However, even though 
privacy is considered as a main issue for modern software 
systems, there is disagreement concerning the concrete 
importance of the different concerns and concrete ways to 
address them [5]. Sheth et al. found that users were more 
concerned about data aggregation and data distortion than 
developers and that no consensus on the best technique could 
be found [5]. Although the importance of privacy is commonly 
accepted, “the measures to reduce privacy concerns are 
divergent” [5]. 
C. Geographical Limitations (Ratione Loci) 
A final remark on the relativity of our work follows from 
the geographical limitations of the legal provisions on data 
protection. In this paper we spoke about EU principles of data 
protection law. Yet, some considerations should be made in 
this regard. On the one hand, we mention that the current Data 
Protection Directive leaves a wide discretionary power at 
national level. As a result, national implementations of EU data 
protection law differ largely amongst the EU Member States. 
Even though the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation aims 
to harmonise the data protection law of the different EU 
Member States, multiple differences will remain [25]. The 
Regulation allows national specifications for a limited list of 
data processing types. For example, Article 81 of the Proposed 
Regulation allows certain specifications for processing 
operations in the employment context. On the other hand, we 
mention that the scope of European data protection legislation 
is always limited to the processing of personal data with a link 
to the European Union. Article 3 of the proposed Data 
Protection Regulation states that the proposal applies to “the 
processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an 
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establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union” or 
when the processing concerns “data subjects residing in the 
Union by a controller not established in the Union, where the 
processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or 
services to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the 
monitoring of their behaviour”. Thus, although the territorial 
scope of the proposed Regulation is very widely formulated, it 
cannot go beyond European sovereignty and therefore, 
processing of personal data with no connection to the Union 
falls outside the scope of the EU data protection law. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
In addition to the legal perspective, much research on 
privacy and data protection has been done in different research 
communities. We summarise the important related work 
focussing on usability and economic aspects of privacy, 
anonymisation techniques, and work from the software and 
requirements engineering community.  
Many recent studies on online social networks show that 
there is a (typically, large) discrepancy between users’ 
intentions for what their privacy settings should be versus what 
they actually are. For example, Madejski et al. report in their 
study of Facebook that 94% of their participants were sharing 
something they intended to hide and 85% were hiding 
something that they intended to share [33]. Liu found that 
Facebook’s users’ privacy settings match their expectations 
only 37% of the time [34]. A recent longitudinal study by 
Stutzman et al. shows how privacy settings for Facebook users 
have evolved over a period of time [35]. These studies have 
focused on privacy settings in a specific online system, while 
our goal is to derive common guidelines for designing any 
privacy-ware app. Further, the main contribution of these 
studies is to show that there is a discrepancy between what the 
settings are and what they should be and how settings evolve 
over time.  
Fang and LeFevre proposed an automated technique for 
configuring a user’s privacy settings in online social 
networking sites [36]. Paul proposed to use a colour- coding 
scheme for making privacy settings more usable [37]. 
Squicciarini, Shehab, and Paci propose a game-theoretic 
approach for collaborative sharing and control of images in a 
social network [38]. Toubiana presents a system that 
automatically applies users’ privacy settings for photo tagging 
[39]. All these papers propose new approaches to make privacy 
settings “better” from a user’s perspective (i.e. more usable and 
more visible). Our work is complementary abd help 
development teams decide when and which of these techniques 
should be implemented together with other privacy features. 
We also focus more on a broader legal requirements 
perspective of privacy than on a specific technical perspective.  
There has been a lot of recent work on the economic 
ramifications of privacy. For example, Acquisti conducted a 
number of field and online experiments to investigate the 
economic valuations of privacy [40]. There has also been a lot 
of work about data anonymisation and building accurate data 
models for statistical use [41] [42] [43] [44]. These techniques 
aim to preserve certain properties of the data (e.g., statistical 
properties like average) so they can be useful in data mining 
while trying to preserve privacy of individual records. 
Similarly, there has also been work on anonymising social 
networks [45] and anonymising user profiles for personalised 
web search [46]. The broad approaches include aggregating 
data to a higher level of granularity or adding noise and random 
perturbations.  
There has been research on breaking the anonymity of data 
as well. Narayanan and Shmatikov show how it is possible to 
correlate public IMDb data with private anonymised Netflix 
movie rating data resulting in the potential identification of the 
anonymised individuals [47]. Backstrom [48] and Wondracek 
[49] describe a series of attacks for de-anonymizing social 
networks. Also in the software engineering community, recent 
papers on privacy mainly focused on data anonymisation 
techniques. Clause and Orso propose techniques for the 
automated anonymisation of field data for software testing 
[50]. They extend the work done by Castro using novel 
concepts of path condition relaxation and breakable input 
conditions resulting in improving the effectiveness of input 
anonymisation [51]. 
Taneja and Grechanik propose using k-anonymity [52] for 
privacy by selectively anonymising certain attributes of a 
database for software testing [53]. They propose novel 
approaches using static analysis for selecting which attributes 
to anonymise so that test coverage remains high. There have 
been some recent papers on extracting privacy requirements 
from privacy regulations and laws [54] [55].  
A few recent papers have also discussed privacy requirements, 
mainly in the context of mobile applications. Mancini 
conducted a field study to evaluate the impact of privacy and 
location tracking on social relationships [56]. Tun et al. 
introduce a novel approach called “privacy arguments” and use 
it to represent and analyse privacy requirements in mobile 
applications [57]. Omoronyia et al. propose an adaptive 
framework using privacy aware requirements, which will 
satisfy runtime privacy properties [58]. Finally, authors in the 
software engineering and requirements engineering 
communities mention privacy in the discussion or challenges 
section of their papers [59]. But in most cases, there is little 
evidence about what, how, and in which context privacy 
concerns exist and what the best measures for addressing them 
are [5]. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There are hundreds of thousands of different apps that 
access and process personal user data. Complex advancements 
in data mining technology, together with a massive increase in 
computing power and data storage capacity made it more 
attractive for app owners to disclose the data of their users to 
third parties for multiple reasons. This situation has put the data 
protection principle of “purpose limitation” under pressure.  
In this paper, we argued that app developers could play an 
important role in the protection of the personal data of app 
users when data are disclosed to third parties. State of the art 
anonymisation techniques can hardly provide sufficient 
solutions for the protection of personal data. We discussed the 
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four main EU data protection principles. These are: purpose 
limitation, data minimisation, data security, and transparency. 
We then interpreted the principles from the perspective of app 
developers and derived technical recommendations and 
requirements, which should be considered when developing 
privacy-aware apps. Important limitations of our work include 
the “legally undefined” role of app developers and the 
geographical limitations of EU data protection law. Finally, app 
developers should also consider additional perspectives when 
implementing privacy-aware apps such as the economic 
perspective, the cultural differences between users and the 
technical affinities of the users. 
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